Tuesday, March 26, 2013

Cypriot Boo Boo - The Dijsselbloem Edition

I might as well just get this over with because it's deservedly quirky and downright hilarious. Here's a statement (yes, this is an official statement!) by the Eurogroup president (Dijsselbloem). Since it's fresh in memory, you may recall it wasn't too long ago that he called Cyprus a new template and ended up spooking the bajeejies out of everyone.

That, of course, led to this!


Which leads me to Pawel Morski's tongue-in-cheek post. It's so well written I'll just post it here but here's the link in any case - for future reference. 

"Well of course everybody’s been completely knackered with the overnight hoo-hah in Nicosia, trying to explain the facts of life to Nicos and chums, who’re clearly not happy anyway and extra jumpy when they hear a Russian accent. Herman had settled down behind his desk for a kip, Wolfgang was in a foul mood, and Mario’s not speaking to anyone at all, since he slammed down the phone on Tuesday saying he was sick of clearing up everybody else’s mess, did we have any idea how much Goldman would pay for a man of his talents etc etc. So the eyes settled on this work-experience lad we’ve had doing a bit of this and that round the office. Not the sharpest tool in the box – main life experience to date was failing a university course in farming IIRC – but keen as mustard and had helped out with the photocopying and got Olli’s ipad hooked up to 3G so we were looking around for something for him to do longer-term. Simple enough we thought. Talk to the press about the little fiasco in Cyprus, sad face about the sacrifices the Halloumi Massive are suffering, calm notes of triumph about our handling of the situation and how European Unity had prevailed.


A bit of background: things have been a little touchy with our German masters of late, what with the elections this year and Angela reading that biography of Bismarck. Now everyone knows it’s never going to happen, but the refusals to buy these lovely big chunks of Spanish and Italian bank equity without bothering about sovereign guarantees have been getting tetchier of late, so we’ve resigned ourselves to Operation Silence: nobody discusses how we’re going to fix the banks without anyone who has money being involved, Mario papers over the cracks and hopefully something comes up and the whole mess just goes away, because if push comes to shove, there’s not enough money in the pot to make everyone whole. 
Unfortunately, what little Jeroen didn’t get was the importance of keeping your trap shut in Operation Silence. So he launches off on this tirade about how Cyprus was only the start , what happened to Russian money launderers today will be Spanish widows tomorrow, depositors of Europe line up to be sheared. And bugger the carefully-prepared script about “Cyprus is unique”, oh no he has to say it’s a template for the rest of Europe, so if you live in colder climes, invest in a sleeping bag, because you’re going to be spending a lot of time waiting for the ATM.
Of course this goes down like a cup of cold sick with the spivs in the markets, blood on the screens, Euro down the toilet, and within seconds we’ve got Francois on line one, Mariano on line two, and the rest of the switchboard jammed by Italians all claiming to be the next Prime Minister. 
So quickest reverse-ferret in history, very pointed two-liner on the website (would’ve been three lines, but managed to persuade Pierre that “little clog-wearing cretin” didn’t sound very ministerial). So job done for now, These Are Not The Bailout Templates You Were Looking For but lord help us if the cat ever does get out of the bag."

Made my day!

Cyprus - An EINO

Munchau doubles down regarding, as you may recall, his 10-days-to-save-the-euro sometime back in 2011. In a sense he's wrong but in more important ways he's absolutely right. Underestimating the ad-hoc will of the EU political elite to keep this monstrous failure of an experiment going is no cause to rejoice. Munchau has several lines of clarity coupled with disdain to what he sees as an immoral attitude to keep the struggle alive.

On the possibility of a banking union, he says, "An operational banking union that comprises supervision, resolution and deposit insurance would have been a minimally sufficient condition to make a divergent monetary system work against the odds. It would have solved the problems of the Cypriot banks for sure. But the eurozone does not have such a banking union. It will not have such a banking union in five years. Germany rejects it flat out on the grounds that it is too expensive for the German taxpayer. Ironically, Cyprus would also reject it as it would kill the country’s business model as an offshore centre for foreign deposits. Whatever banking union will ultimately emerge in the long run will be irrelevant to this crisis."

He then talks about the three blunders the Cypriot government committed:
1) Seeking help from Russia that was interpreted as a hostile move which eventually backfired due to the Russian reaction
2) Lack of communication with the euro group during those three critical days last week
3) Their proposal to create a sovereign wealth fund backed by pension funds and state assets - this was swiftly dismissed by Merkel.

Instead of harping on about the Cyprus fiasco, Munchau looks at the big picture for the long run. No matter how many times you hear this, it just cannot get old. The asymmetry of austerity-led adjustment has been having/will have a slow, cumulative and dooming effect on the euro because the perversion of this austerity drive has led the eurozone to run a primary surplus during a recession. The scope for any adjustment, therefore, is zero.

He also claims immorality in that every decision taken seems to run contrary to the interest of the people or the common good and over time, this manifests itself politically. 

A couple of notes I read elsewhere mentioned the scope of the trilemma for Cyprus as it moves forward into a very painful phase. Informally, it would seem that Cyprus has left the euro because when you think of it, a euro in a Cypriot bank is no longer worth a euro in a German bank and the moment you introduce capital controls , the concept of a unified monetary system should slowly disintegrate. 

The whole point, in fact, of a perfect monetary union involves the free flow of capital at its roots. If this is removed, my euro sitting in Cyprus is not the same as my euro in Germany. It's inferior and essentially, it's another currency. An EINO - a euro in name only. 

For the most part, since capital mobility is assumed (except in certain cases/economies), it comes down to a choice of fixing an exchange rate or running an independent monetary policy. Hong Kong chooses its rate and gives up the latter while the US floats and sets its own rates. Once Cyprus imposes capital restrictions, logically the next step (since it's theoretically under the euro) would be to assume its own monetary regime. And then...

A few more interesting looks before I end:

Ed Conway's harsh post with this conclusion, "Which is why we’re all here today. To see what happens when a nation state is cruelly mistreated by those who claimed to have its best interests at heart."

Pawel Morski's tweets

Krugman on forgetting OCA's, because PCA's are the new in thing.

Tim Duy on more of the same.


Tuesday, March 19, 2013

All You Need to Read - The Cyprus Edition (Links)

Just a primer - if I were to elaborate, I and you would be here all night. So pick and choose and prepare yourself for an overdose. One of the better solutions I've seen is here. I can't download the paper , but I hope you can. It involves leaving the guaranteed deposits untouched and converting the excess into term CDs (5 or 10 years).

To Be Ireland or Iceland? (PIIE)

IMF Article IV

Financial Markets haven't freaked out over Cyprus, that doesn't mean we're in the clear (WaPo-WonkBlog)

First they came for the deposits... (FT)

Cyprus and banks: Nicosia in a twist (Lex)

Cyprus needs to find a quick debt fix (WSJ)

Get in there Cyprus! (Alphaville)

Last Euro-crisis Taboo broken (Spiegel)

Cyprus Scary Move (Jim O'Neill)

Cyprus finds exciting new way to make everyone miserable (Dealbreaker)

Gazprom's Audacious Offer (Quartz)

Official Statement by the Eurogroup President

F*ckin' Europe, Again (The Reformed Broker)

Eurozone urges Cyprus to save its small depositors from levy (Reuters)

Cyprus Depositor's Fate sealed in Berlin (FT)

The Russians are coming! (Krugman)

Ignoramus Osborne (BI)

Cyprus: A Brutal Lesson in Realpolitik (Pawel Morski)

Island Nightmares (Krugman)

Watch the Cyprus Bombast (Ritholtz)

ECB Cyprus Debt Stats (ECB)

Cyprus Crisis will soon blow over (Marketwatch)

The Cyprus File (The Big Picture/Das)

The war on common sense continues (Tim Duy)

What will savers do? (Buttonwood)

Bank of Spain says it sees no sign of deposit flight (Reuters)

First memorandum makes a second almost a certainty (Econcyma)

Genius plan or the end of the euro (Karl Whelan)

Deposit insurance, bank runs, international currencies and the inflation tax (Nick Rowe)

Some thoughts on German politics and the saver's tax in Cyprus (Ed Harrison)

Cypriot bailout reverberates beyond the EU (GMM)

Unfair, short-sighted, self defeating (Schumpeter)

Facing bailout tax, Cypriots try to get cash out of banks (NYT)

Roubini on Cyprus (Part I and Part II) (RGE)

What will Russia do? (Alphaville/Mackenzie)

Everything you need to know about Cyprus (WaPo/Wonkblog)

Paying for the gross mistakes of Greece (Erol Riza)

A bank levy in Cyprus, and why not to worry (Dealbook/Sorkin)

A much better alternative for Cyprus (Salmon)

Europe's reckless raid on Cyprus's savings (Bloomberg Ed)



Monday, March 18, 2013

On the left, nothing's right, and on the right, nothing's left

I just spent about an hour (feels like 24!) gauging the reaction to the ongoing Nicosian Nightmare. I kept looking for loopholes, errors in information, hints of any rationale beyond what is naturally obvious. And for the life of me, I can't seem to find much.

Back in 1991, during India's BOP crisis, Singh quoted Hugo in saying that nothing on earth could stop an idea whose time is/has come. 

Now apply the same logic here but imagine if it's a stupid one.

The idea here, is the "upfront one-off stability levy" where one can clearly see four words out of which three are misnomers.

You see, there doesn't seem to be much "upfront" about this. If you're an investor holding Cypriot debt, nothing happens to your holdings (for the time being anyway!). On the other hand, if your money is in an account, you're going to lose some of it. How much? What do you get in return? Ah, there's the little grey area. 

If you've got more than 100,000 euros, you take a 9.9% hit. Why? Because double digit numbers are far scarier! I'm not sure whether this percentage is on residual amounts or the entire account but I'm also not sure it matter that much relatively. More importantly, there doesn't seem to be a floor on these holdings. So if I'm a homeless person with 100 euros in my account (or whatever the minimum is!), I'm going to lose 6.7% when the bank reopens. If that's progressive, then I'm the Queen. 

I think I digressed a little there but it's hard not to, so bear with me. 
The one-off part is tricky. I was under the impression that the Greek bailout was unique and "one-off". And Ireland too. And Portugal. And even Spain's shoring up of its banking sector. To this, I can only pessimistically state that things are only one-off till they happen again. Personally, I wouldn't trust someone again if they did it once.

Stability? Boring. It seems like Cyprus's main concern wasn't to protect its smaller depositors but rather ensure that it's bloated banking sector plush with a lot of Russian money didn't suffer too much and cause panic among the big fish. That corporate tax rate increase of 2.5% seems more geared at maintaining competitiveness - which is another way of also saying that they'd rather not lose the offshore safe-haven status that they've had all this while. 

And while I'm at it, even levy seems like a misnomer! After all, what's wrong with "upfront one-off stability confiscation?". Is this a tax? Is it a haircut? Legally? Practically? Questions, questions and more questions...

To be sure, if you're a resident of Cyprus you're not getting nothing in return. For that percentage, depositors will receive banking shares equivalent to the amount levied. Then again, I'm not sure how much comfort that is. My money is liquid, I can withdraw it anytime. I can't do that with shares. 

More importantly (other than this liquidity boo-boo), what exactly is the real value of my shares? What the government deems them to be? Nope. What I'll be able to sell them at when I can. Sorry, but I'm not taking this cash-to-equity deal if I have a choice. 

Now that my rant seems to be over, I could think logically and explore other reactions. Cotterill over at Alphaville makes a similar point in a more human way - namely that the absence of a floor is puzzling. Essentially, a Russian oligarch (non-resident) has the same protection (or lack of it!) as a Cypriot widow! As logic dictates, the only rationale for this is that somewhere lies the interest in the maintenance of Cyprus as an offshore banking centre. 
He also makes the point (after unsuccessfully playing a bit of devil's advocate), that we mustn't forget that there's no lack of preparation anywhere. This was done over a bank holiday weekend. In addition, the deposit for equity swap only complicated things further given that Cypriot banks have recapitalization issues and would seem to be highly inequitable, if you could call it that. 

The underlying point though, is that small deposits are almost sacrosanct. Insured deposits are almost like moral bonds. They're insured for a reason. The math is inexact but could the 6.7% on <100,000 deposits have been raised by levying the uninsured more? At the cost of a double digit levy? If that was the case, would there be even more panic on the bigger deposits leading to large chunks of capital flight? It's a bit tricky if you think through it.

The most important thing though, and I can't stress this enough even though it's also the most reactively logical worry - is the very real possibility of contagion. If my money lies in Spain or Portugal etc. why shouldn't I move it out? It's not that easy for one. There are limits on withdrawals, restrictions on transfers and a lack of immediate ease in opening new accounts etc. But does that mean I won't try?

From the perspective of a Cypriot depositor (resident or non-resident), if you've levied my savings, you've broken my trust. One-off or not, the bond is forever broken. The question is, what comes next?

One Goldman analyst seems to think a bit differently - that while a deal like this could easily lead to short-term volatility, the fall-out is likely to be contained, assuming a ratification in parliament this week (not a gimme, by any means!)

The biggest worry of how other depositors in the EU periphery will react can be tempered by the ECB waiting on the sidelines, ready to combat signs of deposit flight using the ELA and other ad hoc measures. Another important point that he makes is that private creditors being asked to share more of the restructuring burden seems to be a "natural continuation of a trend developing on the euro banks bailouts front". 

To be clear, it's self-evident why the push for deposit haircuts took place. From the IMF's vantage point, having the government on hook for the entire bailout amount would have caused a debt-GDP ratio of about 145%, a level and trajectory dynamic deemed unsustainable and essentially removing the Fund from loan contributions. For clarity, the math here is easy - the government needed about 17 billion euros (about the size of the Cyprus economy) but they could only get 10 so the difference was accounted for through the UOOSL (you-sill! - how cool does that sound?)

Meanwhile, while it's true that politicians rarely say what's on their mind, Finance minister Michalis Sarris's statement has an undercurrent of poignancy, guilt and something else I can't quite put my finger on. He said, "I am not happy with this outcome in the sense that I wish I was not the minister that had to do this, but I feel that responsible course...general welfare...stability of system...blah blah..."

He also said that the government had (naturally!) moved to ensure deposit holders could not make large withdrawals electronically before the opening on Tuesday. The perfect ambush it would seem! Furthermore, Asmussen (an ECB board member) mentioned monitoring of deposit flows on an intraday (try intra-minute if things get worse!) basis for signs of a bank run but then he justified the measure by basically saying that the burden has been broadened. On whose shoulders? 

Funnily enough, he also justifies that going after all large deposit holders (Russians, Britishers) would ensure that outsiders help fund the rescue; conveniently enough, he forgets about there being no floor. 

El-Erian plays a bit of advocate too, and states four reasons why influential EU countries (Germany *cough) would have forced Cyprus into this situation. The size of the banking sector, lax regulation/reputation, adverse alternatives, and the issue of moral hazard. But in their own right, these issues are relatively weak and he spends more time instead, castigating not the decision but its construct. He feels that the approach reeks of regressiveness and undermines the powerful concept of a deposit insurance scheme. 

The most forthright opinion unsurprisingly, is Munchau's who re-emphasizes the looming and dooming scenario of a run. He makes it clear that this is not a default nor an imposition of loss. Legally, this could be a wealth tax and economically, a haircut. I'm not sure there's anyone who would argue against a depository tax on amounts above 100,000 euros (the insurable ceiling). The point, as made here again, is that it represents a default on an insurance guarantee for bank deposits

It's easy to understand how it played out up till a certain point. Bailout determined at 17 billion -> Germany rejects loan that they know Cyprus will default on -> turn to depositors -> big deposits wouldn't have sufficed. They key here is the last point. Is it that they wouldn't have sufficed or what it came with adverse consequences?

Rightly so, the after-effects will be colossal because politics will soon enter the fray. One needs to only look across at Italy to see this. Munchau states that it is only rational to expect Cypriot savers to withdraw their money for protection from further possible haircuts. An experience like this only further reinforces the view that the "solvency of a deposit insurance scheme is only as good as that of the state". Italy? Spain? Portugal? Therein lies your answer. 

The problem is that a bank run is a horrible spiraling snowball that gathers mass and momentum at astonishing speeds. Munchau ends aptly  saying that the euro zone's complacency over the past year might come back to haunt it and most importantly, depositors know and believe that even though Draghi said "whatever it takes", "whatever" it takes could also mean their deposits. 

To end, I can't help but attempt to analyze the rationale once again. Was the risk of contagion not clear enough or did it work no matter which path was taken? Why stir the hottest pot in the kitchen when there's more than one alternative? And most shockingly, where were the morals while determining who gets what portion of the whack? Why aren't bondholders being hit? 

And because I'm finally sick of questions, the whole point of "sound banking" is the encouragement of deposits. As a Schumpeter column claims, deposits are "sticky" (insured) and "flighty" (can be moved). Impact on the first will trigger the second because the confidence assumption of deposits never running will fail. That's when stuff might hit the ceiling. 

As a post-script, might we imagine what happens Tuesday morning when banks reopen? Might we see lines at ATMs (Salmon claims this is already happening)? 

The President says that the alternative would have been catastrophic for the banks but he failed to mention the bank-runnin' sword of damocles hanging over their heads now. What he also fails to mention is that his government pledged and promised to guarantee their citizens' money up to a 100,000 euros - even in extreme circumstances. 

As of now, that promise is not even worth the paper it was written on. And that to me, says it all.

Friday, March 8, 2013

80 is the number of the Debt-Gods

Finally got down to doing this, though as you'll see, a lot of people have already got there first. Takedown? Sort of. 

There's a paper out (couple of weeks, perhaps) by four authors, one of which is Mishkin. On a side-note, that immediately brought back summer school memories of college back to me. 7:00 AM - Three hours of Money & Banking. Go figure!

Anyway...It's regarding the whole debt-level debate. Namely - is there a debt level beyond which...BAD things happen? I think a holistic way to approach this is to admit defeat. Even if you're country specific, you're dealing with annual data, which is no fun. More importantly, the whole "original sin" literature comes into play. Is there really default risk when you're issuing your own currency? What kind of premium would investors demand? An inflationary risk? What else?

Just a few thoughts such as these would force one to immediately rule out what the authors proceeded to do...A PANEL! 20 advanced countries (more on this later!), 12 years (2000 - 2011) (the data is annual), and it all starts with a regression on average nominal yields on long-term debt - later the dependent becomes the interest rate and the predictors are gross debt, net debt and the CAB. 

Yup, as easy as that.

As someone who had a really really tough time doing a fair bit of graduate work in statistics, being appalled could be an understatement here. Essentially, you're grouping a diverse set of countries. You're not accounting for a lot of differences and then you're "panelling" them together conveniently, cutely concluding (among other things) that:
a) the coefficients of gross and net debt are highly "statistically" significant.
b) If the primary deficit increases by 1%, the cost of borrowing would move up 4.5 basis points. 
c) 80% is when bad things happen (okay i'm being a bit mean and general here but still...they said it not me - "Countries with debt above 80 percent of G.D.P. and persistent current-account deficits are vulnerable to a rapid fiscal deterioration as a result of these tipping-point dynamics”)

I'd better be done otherwise I'd spend the rest of the evening reading, re-reading and writing/ranting furiously. The good thing is that a lot of my work here has already been done - a fair bit of the online media/blogosphere has it covered.

Matt O'Brien at the Atlantic has this to say:

"Not all debt is created equal. Countries that borrow in a currency they control play under a different set of rules. They can never run out of money to pay back what they owe, since they can always print what they need as a last resort. That's not to say they actually do or should turn to the printing-press to finance themselves. But the option to do so calms markets. After all, inflation is a lot less bad than default for creditors. That's why it's not so easy for countries that don't borrow in a currency they control. They can default. And this is a case where thinking can make things so. Indeed, as Paul De Grauwe points out, countries that don't have their own central bank, like euro members, can fall victim to self-fulfilling panics that push them into bankruptcy. In other words, markets force up interest rates because they fear default -- which then pushes them into default. It's a bank-run on a country.

So we have to answer one big question. How much of Greenlaw & Co.'s results are driven by euro countries that have completely different debt dynamics than non-euro countries? "

I'm sure you asked that too. Here's the answer:

"12 of the 20 countries they look at are either part of the euro, or, in Denmark's case, pegged to it. The remaining ones show no signs of anything resembling debt tipping points. Often the reverse. That's simple enough to see if we break up their sample. The chart below looks at the pre-crisis years from their sample, and shows the non-euro countries in red, the core-euro countries in green, and the (later) troubled PIIGS countries in blue. Back then, at least, there wasn't any difference between -- except for Japan, which had far more debt, and far lower borrowing costs. Nor was there much of any discernible relationship between debt and interest rates."

O'Brien proceeds to go ahead and do somewhat what I would have done if I found the time. Recreate the data set and SPLIT THE COUNTRIES! Non-euro and PIIGS.

"Translated: our equation for the PIIGS tells us increasing debt by 1 percentage point of GDP increases borrowing costs by 8.4 basis points -- but increasing the current account deficit by 1 percentage point of GDP increases borrowing costs by 91 basis points! The PIIGS do have a serious problem, but that problem is borrowing too much from foreigners, not too much government borrowing, in general. Of course, this isn't exactly new information. Paul Krugman, among others, has been pointing out for years that the euro crisis is really a balance of payments crisis that just looks like a debt crisis because of the common currency."

Basically the variables are faaaaaaaaar from significant.

Enough on O'Brien though, Binyamin Applebaum at Economix looks at the ephemeral anomaly that is Japan to which the authors wax eloquent of the specialty that is Japan and then lop it off (that's 5% of the sample, FYI). He's less wonkish, more middle-ground (seemingly!) and admits that it's naive to put numbers on this just as it is naive to have what is (in my own words) a VERY SPURIOUS sample! He says, 

"This is quite possibly true. But because there are not very many developed countries — in this study Japan is just one of 20 — it also might cause a reader to wonder about the universality of any rules derived from the remaining 19 cases, particularly since half of the remaining sample share a currency and an economic union. They are not exactly independent variables."

Really?!!

But moving on, Megan McArdle for the Daily Beast writes,

There is a real danger in leaning too heavily on data from small countries that don't have the same control over their currency that the US enjoys.  Borrowing in a foreign currency (or ceding control over your monetary policy through mechanisms like currency zones or currency pegs) creates a new category of risks that places like the US don't face."

The problem with Ms. McArdle is what she writes next:

"Now that Democrats are starting to argue that our goal should be to just stabilize the debt over the next decade at 75-80% of GDP, these question has some fairly timely policy relevance. If there is a tipping point, and we're close to it, we should probably be trying to back off the precipice.  Slowly and cautiously, so as to avoid some sort of rock slide--but back away, none the less."

And finally Neil Irwin over at Wonkblog for the WaPo has this to add,

"Considering that the paper was presented at a monetary policy conference, and that its authors include a former Federal Reserve governor (Mishkin), it seems not to grapple enough with the crucial difference between the United States and many of the countries that are among the nations included in the historical analysis the paper is based on. Almost all of the countries that have experienced major financial crises in the recent past have in some way lacked control over their currency. For Greece and Ireland, that is because they use the euro, whose value is determined by the European Central Bank, the value of which is better suited for Germany and France than for those troubled peripheral European economies. In the East Asian crisis of the late 1990s, much of the damage came about because the countries involved had borrowed money in dollars, so when the value of their domestic currencies fell they suddenly had more onerous debt burdens than they had expected."

Irwin writes that for the fiscal scene to turn sour, one could think of a "confidence crisis" (sounds like a vigilante attack!) in US debt leading to capital outflows blah blah. But this paper doesn't do that. 

What this paper is, amongst many other things, as Boston Fed Pres Rosengren put it SO APTLY, is "parsimonious". Which in this case, is statspeak (unless parsimony is used for good!) for this-is-too-simple-do-you-not-realize-we're-in-the-real-world-here. Rosengren also asks about banking sector stability among other things. 

Anyway, I've suddenly gotten a bit tired of this paper now. 

I wish people would question it more. 
I wonder what 90%-ers Reinhart and Rogoff think of this. 
And I can't believe the man who taught me Money & Banking (well...through his proxy, my actual Professor!) was a part of this!

Just look at the traction this has gained. It's quite unbelievable to my inexperienced mind. That's all.

Oh, here's the paper.


Wednesday, March 6, 2013

EU Democrises

I have a toss-up between De Grauwe's work and a Mazower (of the History-of-an-Idea fame) article that appeared in the FT where he contrasts the EZ's political state and comes down upon the austerity preachers fairly hard. He states that:

"Greece, in particular, showed that even if capital flows might be going in the right direction, the democratic deficit was widening. No one has much cared outside Greece that a neo-Nazi party could shoot to above 10 per cent in the polls. But it is a warning of what can happen to other eurozone members."

Furthermore,

"Technocrat prime minsters, such as Italy’s Mario Monti or Greece’s Lucas Papademos, are no alternative: they may have clean hands because they remained outside party politics. But they are creatures of banking and economics. While they may understand money, that no longer recommends them to the voters who would rather have someone who understands them.


The result is dangerous. It is but a short step from writing off the political class to writing off the institutions of democracy. So far most voters have not done this in either Italy or Greece. But some have and the temptation is there for more to do so, whether by drifting towards the far right, towards an anti-capitalism that is the prisoner of its own revolutionary rhetoric, or towards a kind of anarchic alternative to party politics – the direct democracy espoused by Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement in Italy."

It's painfully obvious to see how oblivious the power-holders/austerity-drivers in Europe are to the political quagmire that pervades all across the land. The consequences of the austerity drive have led to discontent and social scarring, that over time will prove more and more difficult to resolve. 

Just yesterday, somebody tweeted a picture of tens of thousands lined up on the streets of Lisbon. Were they celebrating a European cup for Sporting Lisbon? Nope. Protesting against austerity. There's a downward spiral of exacerbation that rears its ugly head during the election cycle. Nothing supercedes enfranchisement and when the time comes, again and again, governments will be wiped out until one caters to the masses. 

And that is precisely why and economic crisis, though inextricably linked, is no match for a democratic crisis. 

Mazower ends thus:

"Those preaching austerity probably do not see themselves as contributing to a crisis of democracy, but they are. The Italian elections should remind Eurozone leaders to pay attention to their voters. Economic fixes have failed to staunch a political crisis that has the capacity to harm not only EU integration, but the legitimacy of the continent’s democratic order itself."

It's another one of the million warnings that no one seems to want to heed.

Solow's Debt Facts

Robert Solow had an Op-Ed in the IHT on a few debt pointers. It seems straightforward enough but it's not entirely right and it's not entirely wrong either. His main bullets are that:

 - Of the public debt ($11.7 trillion), half is now owed to foreigners. This part is a "direct burden to future generations" and essentially these foreigners can use the interest/principal etc. to acquire goods and services produced here. 

Not entirely sure why this is necessarily a bad thing per se. Increased foreign demand for US goods and services should lead to upward pressure on production and employment. Of course, that depends on what capacity the economy is running at relative to global capacity to consume etc. but you get the point. Solow does make an obvious mainstream (I hope!) point here - that if this borrowed money were being invested in infrastructure or worker skills etc. that would make sense. Wars and Tax cuts? Not so much!

 - The Treasury owes Dollars.

As simple as that. Solow's explanation is that the Treasury can always pay interests/principals unless it is held hostage by the law (political impasse). However, if investors really expected a risk of default, the premium would show in the US's borrowing cost. I wish Solow would demarcate the currency-issuing line a bit more forcefully though. Otherwise those "America is the next Greece under Obama" chants from the right might never cease! 

- US Debt can be repudiated by encouraging inflation

Naturally, rising prices make the purchasing power of the dollar worth less at the time of paying back than what it was at the time of borrowing. But repudiate sounds wrong because debt (unless you consider TIPS) are nominally denominated and paying on these default securities is practice, not denial. Tricky use of language, I would think. Investors aren't clueless, everyone knows what's happening with the CPI.

- Bonds owned by Americans are different from bonds held by foreigners

Again, the line itself seems shockingly naive but Solow's argument simplified is of ignoring the "burden" of foreign demand. This distinction of debt staying within borders doesn't do justice to the ability of the US treasury to borrow from anyone. An American bondholder could just as easily hoard that cash while a foreigner could demand US goods leading to increased production/employment etc. 

The next two interlinked points relate to the crowding-out effect and the impact of budget deficits on private savings and investment. Solow states that if the government wouldn't borrow so much (fewer bonds for sale), investors would seek out corporate bonds/ stocks thereby spurring investment and creating profit. 
...but wait!...his caveat is that "in bad times like now"...contrary to that lucid theory, debt-financed government spending adds to the aggregate demand and provides a home for excess saving. 

This, I think, is where the sectoral balance sheet approach comes in handy and seems to be conveniently ignored - that a public sector deficit accomadates the private sector mass and rapid deleveraging that we've witnessed. 

Thankfully, Solow ends with, "But for now the best chance to reinvigorate the economy, spur business investment and encourage consumer spending is through public borrowing and spending. Instead, we’re heading into an ill-advised, across-the-board austerity program."

Cue one for the anti-austerians.

The Fed and Inflation

Another unavoidable hiatus, this is getting all too frequent. Speaking of frequent, that's exactly what's happening in the blogosphere. This one taking down that, that one refuting this. Sometimes the publicity involved seems to be determining the content! Not a good thing. In the meanwhile, I realized I left open some pages from Friday so this will be stale. Relevant perhaps, but definitely stale.

Here's Bob Corker, a junior Tennessee senator  from the right trying to "grill" Bernanke at a hearing. Corker, for the background, is a successful "businessman" having started a construction company and sold it. You know, the ones the right say built America.


Sen. Corker: I don't think there's any question that you would be the biggest dove, if you will, since World War II. I think that's something you're rather proud of...Do you all ever talk about the longer term degrading effect of these policies as we try to live for today?
Chairman Bernanke: I think one concern we have is the effect of long term unemployment and the people who haven't had jobs for years. That means they're never going to acquire skills for years and be a productive part of our workforce
You called me a dove. Well maybe in some respects I am but on the other hand my inflation record is the best of any Federal Reserve chairman in the post-war period, or at least one of the best — about 2 percent average inflation... 

Well that's how you define trying to bait someone and Bernanke has a great response - I would've played School-the-senator but then that's one of the million reasons why I'll never be a Fed Chairman. Courtesy Tim Duy, Bernanke isn't entirely wrong:
Here's CPI:
and here's PCE:

Everyone knows Volcker presided over the biggest decline but Bernanke's numbers don't lie. And more importantly, the Fed has a dual mandate. Even more importantly, the goal isn't low inflation, it's stable inflation. We're not too far removed from deflationary fears in any case. Inflation's not the only thing the Fed has had to look out for

Sometimes I try and imagine an academic being grilled by a representative of "the people" - some random congressman representing a small district or state, having done his/her 2 cents of research and trying to trip up someone like Bernanke. How do they keep their exasperation under control?